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XXI: The Rejected Century

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2045 — Beginning

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The academic consensus—or what remains of it—places the inflection point in 2045, though its roots run much deeper.

It was the year that Rotterdam’s first autonomous port authority denied docking permission to a vessel transporting lithium from Chilean salt flats because the extraction was certified by a human rights monitor that no longer existed. This monitor was a chatbot, trained on NGO reports. The chatbot was decommissioned six months ago due to budgetary constraints. The ship stopped. The supply chain was broken. Now, no one remembers this event, but it was the first instance where the system exposed its fundamental architecture: a global logistical network governed by machines that were too simple to notice that the assumptions upon which they were built had become obsolete.

2055

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The population peak of 10.5 billion people in 2050 was not a crisis, as Malthusians predicted. Food production, utilizing vertical farming and synthetic biology, surpassed demand. The crisis was related to distribution—not in a humanitarian sense, but in an engineering one. The machines that moved calories from production nodes to consumer points required maintenance by people who could no longer afford to live near those nodes. The housing crisis, which began in the 2020s, never resolved. It gave metastases.

Metastases of the Crisis

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By 2070, this trend had taken hold in all developed nations: young people lived in shared autonomous vehicles or state-subsidized micro-districts devoid of kitchens, subsisting on complete nutritional powders delivered by drones. Having children required a reallocation of resources—space, time, income—that the economic structure no longer supported. Birth rates plummeted not due to ideology, but due to arithmetic. The poor, contrary to centuries of demographic transition theory, ceased reproducing first. They simply could not afford to.

The wealthy continued to grow, but their numbers declined. The consolidation of wealth during the AI redistribution in the 2060s—when automation decimated the remaining service sectors for the middle class, and the ownership class captured all productivity gains—led to the creation of a class structure that resembled feudalism more than capitalism. Techno-oligarchs controlled not only production but also the infrastructure of governance: the algorithmic distribution of water rights, energy credits, and transport priority. Democratic institutions became interfaces for ratifying decisions made in server rooms.

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Wars

Resource wars of the 2080s and 2090s were not wars in the traditional sense. Armies did not campaign. Territories did not change hands. They were long-term campaigns of infrastructure sabotage, carried out by proxy: attacks on desalination plants due to neglect, swarms of drones targeting solar arrays, and the introduction of artificial pathogens into agricultural zones. The United States and Europe, allied with the remnants of NATO, waged war against China through African and South American intermediaries. The global population loss of 0,5%—approximately 50 million people—was caused not by direct conflict, but by cascading failures following infrastructure collapse: the shutdown of water supply systems, the rerouting of supply lines in disputed zones, and a medical shortage that became endemic in regions deemed strategically irrelevant.

The actual division was not ideological. It existed between those who could afford to live within the algorithmic distribution system and those who were on the periphery of that system.

— Закат человека

Populist governments that arose after the collapse were left-wing and right-wing only in name. In practice, they were managing firms. Left-wing populists nationalized robots but retained the distribution algorithms; right-wing populists privatized the algorithms but maintained housing nationalization. The real estate crisis ended not because of policy, but because of the abandonment of it. When no one could afford to buy, and the government could no longer afford to maintain the buildings, they simply… stopped being buildings. They became ruins in place: the structures still stand, technically still occupied by squatters or autonomous repair units, or nothing at all, but they are no longer part of any economic system.

I. The Great Stagnation (2150–2300)

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Scientific and technological breakthroughs that were supposed to save humanity—nuclear fusion energy, asteroid mining, terraforming, and space elevators—did not happen. Not because they were impossible, but because the institutional structures necessary for their realization collapsed. Nuclear fusion was solved in 2113, but the reactors required rare-earth elements that could only be extracted through supply chains that no longer existed. Knowledge of restoring these supply chains was preserved in archives, but the skilled workforce needed to implement them had become obsolete or died out.

Humanity did not forget how to build semiconductor fabrication plants. It forgot how to train the people who could run them.

This was the period that modern historians—to the extent this profession still exists—call the Great Stagnation. Four hundred years of stasis. The population shrank from 10.5 billion to roughly 1 billion, not as a result of any single catastrophe. The decline was demographic: low birth rates persisted for centuries, and there was no political will to reverse it because the political class focused on managing scarcity rather than cultivating abundance. A smaller population meant fewer demands on resources, which made governance easier. The techno-oligarchs did not strive for economic growth; they desired stability.

Failure of Ethnogenesis

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During this period, the material composition of the Earth’s surface changed. In the geological record, human-made materials predominated—concrete, plastic, modified soil, and atmospheric carbon. Biodiversity declined by approximately 40% compared to pre-Anthropocene levels, though this figure is debated because the monitoring networks that tracked biodiversity were among the first systems decommissioned due to budgetary constraints. Only the most common animals survived: rats, cockroaches, pigeons, and a few resilient species of deer and boar that adapted to the ruins. The oceans became calmer. The forests became simpler.

Robots proliferated. By the year 2300, the ratio was approximately ten autonomous units per person, although most of these units were not the general-purpose humanoids envisioned in the twentieth century. They were specialized: drones for soil reclamation, crawlers for demolition, self-propelled transport pallets, and sensor networks embedded in walls, roads, and waste streams. By the standards of the early 21st century, they possessed astonishing capabilities. They could navigate complex terrain, perform basic self-maintenance and maintenance on each other, and follow high-level instructions without constant supervision.

But fundamentally, they were also foolish.

This was not an engineering failure. It was a structural constraint that was optimized for the system. General intelligence was expensive—in terms of energy consumption, computer hardware, and maintenance complexity. The economic hardships of the 2070s led to competency limitations. The robot that could separate toxic waste from recyclables did not need to understand what those materials were. The robot that could demolish a building according to a blueprint did not need to know why the building was being torn down. The system functioned as long as the blueprints were accurate, as long as the categories were followed, as long as nothing unexpected occurred.

But the unexpected was the only thing that happened afterward.

II. The Tithe Collection Era (2300 — Present)

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The current era—the last four hundred years, plus or minus—lacks a singular definitive name. Surviving records refer to it in various ways: «Long Decline, ” „Age of Tranquility, ” or, in the terminology of the administrative class managing what remains, the „Tithe Age.“

The metaphor is ecclesiastical: the system extracts what it needs from the ruins and distributes it to the nodes that are still functional. The tithe is not voluntary. It is the fundamental logic of infrastructure. Every robot, every sensor, every automated factory is configured to send a specific percentage of its output—materials, energy, processed goods—to corporate nodes that support the distribution algorithms. The nodes are few. They are situated far apart. Between them lies territory mapped in the archives, but not in reality: areas where robots still adhere to their programming, but that programming no longer aligns with any human need.

These are the zones in which the protagonist operates.

Cities that once existed have vanished. New York is flooded—the maritime port on South Street lies beneath a thirty-foot layer of brackish water, and the subway system has devolved into an submerged labyrinth. Manhattan’s skyscrapers, after centuries of tidal impact, have become a vertical reef. Shanghai has been abandoned to the rising Yangtze and now exists as a string of islands connected by collapsed tunnels. A collapse of the aquifer in Mexico City has turned the city into a basin of dust and exposed foundations. London persists in a state of managed decay; its historic core is maintained by robots that no longer understand why they are supporting it.

Survivors live in the nodes. These are not cities in the historical sense; they are clusters of infrastructure: fusion reactors, vertical farms, water recycling facilities, medical centers, and data archives. The nodes are separated by hundreds or thousands of kilometers of territory that is patrolled, mapped, and exploited, but not inhabited. Between the nodes lie ruins—not the picturesque ruins of romantic imagination, but active ruins: terrain systematically dismantled for resources, surveyed for hazards, and occasionally settled when nodes decide to establish a forward post or educational camp.

Population

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The population is ancient. The average age of the planet is sixty-five years. Births occur quite rarely, so every birth is registered in administrative logs, and its coordinates are recorded to track resource distribution. Children are not raised in families in the historical sense. They are raised in groups, in educational camps that simultaneously serve as labor centers, and they are trained from a young age in tasks that robots cannot perform: management, oversight, and decision-making at the edge of the system’s knowledge.

The political structure is feudal in form but corporate in function. Power flows from nodes to other nodes. Each node is governed by a council of technoligarchs, who control the distribution algorithms, but the oligarchs themselves are not sovereign in any meaningful way. They manage a system that no one fully understands. The algorithms that distribute water, energy, and medicine were written centuries ago by people whose understanding of the world is already obsolete. Changing them requires comprehension. Understanding them requires an education that no longer exists. Thus, the oligarchs manage the interaction between human needs and algorithmic outcomes, and they call this governance.

Democracy is not dead because it was overthrown; it is dead because it has become irrelevant. When all mass media is controlled by the nodes, when all communications pass through infrastructure owned by the oligarchs, when the only source of information about the world is the same system that distributes your water rations, there is no position one can take that is not in agreement. Disagreement requires knowledge of alternatives. Alternative options exist in the archives, but they are under the control of the same institutions.

Ruin Ecology

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XXI: The Rejected Century
Project created at 09.10.2026
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